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services/resources, all time accessibility and less resources
Abstract- Electronic negotiation (e-negotiation) is a major allocation [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
activity in e-Commerce applications. Agent-based e-negotiation We assume that negotiating mobile agents are deployed to
has recently received increasing attention. However, agent-based act on behalf of consumers and vendors. We assume that the
electronic negotiation suffers from a number of security attacks. negotiating agents are free-roaming agents that can
In this paper, we present a mobile agent-based e-commerce
framework. We also propose a security protocol that protects the autonomously choose the agent's itinerary based on the
information exchanged between the mobile agents during e- acquired offers and the initiator's initial preferences. We
negotiations. We reason the correctness of the proposed security assume that the agent's code remains intact throughout the
protocol in the presence of various security threats. The agent's itinerary. During negotiation, agents are expected to
reasoning shows that the protocol maintains privacy, non- run in partially unknown and untrustworthy environments.
repudiation, authenticity, anonymity, and strong integrity of They transport from one host to another host through insecureexchanged information.
channels and may execute on non-trusted hosts. Thus, both
Index Terms-Security, E-Commerce, Mobile Agent, E- intruders and non-trusted hosts might perform any of the
Negotiation. fraudulent acts discussed in [7, 8, 10].
In this paper, we address the security risks of information
I. INTRODUCTION exchanged between negotiating mobile agents during the
In emerging electronic markets and other types of online negotiating sessions. The negotiation process might go
trading communities, e-negotiation is a fundamental process through many rounds before the final decision is taken which
[1]. It enables complex trade interactions to find a mutually requires the mobile agents to exchange very sensitive
acceptable agreement among trading partners. Therefore, information. Unfortunately, this information is susceptible to
support for complex multi-attribute business negotiations is a various security risks. Therefore, the information exchanged
critical success factor for the next generation of electronic between the mobile agents during e-negotiation has to be
markets and, more generally, for all types of electronic protected so trading partners can have trust in electronic
exchanges. markets and business. To the best of our knowledge, this
An e-negotiation is a joint decision-making process of two problem has not been addressed sufficiently.
or more parties within an electronic market. An electronic In this paper, we propose a security protocol that safeguards
market is an application that is based on electronic the information exchanged in the course of e-negotiation
communication services and that supports the market processes by the agents acting on behalf of the trading
coordination of economic activities. The negotiation process is partners. The aim of the proposed security protocol is to
an iterative process that represents a multi-criteria preserve privacy, authenticity, anonymity, non-repudiation,
optimization process where every entity tries to maximize its and strong integrity of the exchanged data during negotiation
social welfare within the predefined constraints [1]. Several rounds. It ensures that decisions taken by negotiating agents to
negotiation sessions might take place before the final decision be based on genuine data and would result in the following
is taken and the initiator commits to the winning vendor. benefits:
Recently, negotiating mobile agents have been deployed to * Contribute in the optimization of negotiation process.
act on behalf of trading partners (i.e. consumers and vendors) * Help in achieving individuals' greatest social welfare.
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. These mobile agents might negotiate for terms * Offer fair opportunities for various vendors contributing
of contracts, allocation of complex tasks, cooperation between in a bid.
different mobile agents in the marketplace, services or *Enhance trust in automated negotiation.
resource, and parameters of received proposals [1]. Agent- Weso httepooe rtclesrspiay
based neoito is expected.....torsl.nmc rae authentication, anonymity, strong integrity, and non-
customer's base, optimal social welfare, faster andl verifiable rpdaino h esg xhnebtentembl
agreements, error-free calculations, timely delivery of agents in the course of e-negotiation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a
brief discussion of the security threats to information
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exchanged between agents during e-negotiation is Nevertheless, the security protocols presented in the literature
presented. The proposed protocol is described in details in mainly address the security of the information gathered by
Section 3. A brief analysis of the proposed protocol is given in search agents, security of agent mediated on-line auctions,
Section 4. The conclusions and future direction is discussed in privacy of negotiation strategies, security of bank transactions
Section 5. and privacy of decision making functions [1, 4]. In contrast,
we focus on the security of information exchanged by
II. THREAT MODEL negotiating agents.
During negotiation, agents are expected to run in partially
unknown and untrustworthy environments. This renders the
mobile agents susceptible to various security risks. In this In this section, we discussed mobile agent-based on-line
section, we will discuss these risks with emphases on the trading framework. First, we will discuss the reference
risks associated with the data exchanged by the negotiating architecture and its various components used in the paper. The
agents. negotiation process is also discussed. We will then discuss the
The security of information exchanged by negotiating security proposed security protocol that aims to protect the
agents has six requirements: (a) privacy of negotiated issues; information exchanged between the negotiating mobile agents.
(b) Anonymity (privacy of the identities of customer and A. Reference Architecture
negotiated vendors); (c) strong integrity, non-repudiation,
. I
.
privacy,~~~~~~~~~~~~~ anauhnicto ofecagdifrain Fig. 1 shows the overall architecture and the itinerary of the
proposals (d) Integrity ofb di e)Non-ediationo cooperating agents employed in the proposed protocol. Theproposals~~~~~ ~ ~~.dnert ddtil;()Nnrpda n arrows represent information flows between enhtites as theypurchase order/ payment order; (f) Privacy of customer's bank arrows represen or fowsetwee en s as the
account details. On the other hand, the security requirements negotiatepwithe other fo srices. The abels onrthe
of auction agents are different. An agent acts on behalf of a arosepsntherdriwictemblegnsprfmof actin agntsare i f n Anaget their tasks from the start to the completion of the e-negotiationmerchant that seeks to sell an advertised product for the
highest price offered. Customers submit bids on the product at processes.
on-line auctions and the negotiation continues till no higher I--------------------------------
price is made since the last negotiation round. The security I
requirements are to maintain: (1) Integrity of bids. (2) Privacy
of identities of parties involved in the negotiation. (3) Privacy C-
of a transaction details.
The fraudulent acts that intruders and non-trusted hosts
might perform on the information exchanged between the i L-
negotiating mobile agents can be classified as follows [7, 8, j
10]:
a. Offer-related attacks that include spying out information
about the collected offers or confidential issues of . _=_
agreements; spying out parameters of a collected offer;
tampering with collected offer's; truncating or deleting an
offer of a competing vendor; replacing submitted offer with Fig. 1: Itinerary of the cooperating agents employed in the proposed
a new competing offer; signing other's offer with its private protocol.
key; appending a fake offer and then repudiate it; tampering Generally, there are four hosts: client host (i.e., initiator
with parameters of request for offer (FRO), bid closing time, host), a set of vendor hosts and a trusted host and a Bank
identity of initiator, random nonce identifying a protocol service host. The trusted host provides secure service and acts
run. as a mediator where the evaluation of submitted offers, setting
b. Identity-related attackstat include disclosure identityiot parameters for negotiation, decision making, issuing a
vhendustors. n purchase order, and requesting bank orders can be securelyvendors. executed. Also, we assume that each vendor poses two
c. Payment/purchase-related attacks that include tampering encryption keys, a public key and a private signing key. The
with a payment/purchase order and spying out the
1.I 1. 1identity of the signer of a message can be deduced from ainitiator's bank account details; and spying out and/or
tamper with parameters to negotiate with short d sintradthpulic e fahstcabe fud in the
vendors. iste ~~~~~~~server's known-hosts list or iS distributed to a host upon
Thus, it is fundamental to ensure the security of information reusfomteelvnhs.
' . . . . .
~~~~~~~~~Theproposed protocol uses three mobile agents: controllerexchanged during e-negotiation, particularly the negotiated agn.C).okragn W) n tn ayrgsr gn
parameters. In order to prevent or at least detect malicious acts (R) h eal fteeaet r sflos
of adversaries, different security measures have to be in place.
* The controller agent (CA) - stores the critical data (e.g.,
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offer vector, expiry time of the bid) and critical functions would collect the best offers from the short listed vendors in
(e.g., scoring functions, decision functions, and tactic step (3) and then it migrates to the trusted host for decryption,
function). verification, sorting, and decision making purposes. Next, it
* The worker agent (WA) - stores the non-critical data in a communicates with the winning vendor Vw that offers the
tuple S and functions such as part of the tactic function. most suitable package in step (4) and further negotiates with
* The itinerary registry agent (IRA) - stores the addresses of it. It sends it a purchase order and Alice's personal details to
the visited vendors in a vector Z and the time t at which the Vendor Vw in step (4). Then, it sends a payment order in step
agent got executed at the respective vendor's host. (5) to Alice's bank service on behalf of Alice. Next, the bank
Negotiation process involves evaluation, ranking of the processes the payment in step (6) to vendor Vw. Next, vendor
submitted offers, and generating a short list of vendors to Vw proceeds on confirming the booking of the ticket for Alice
negotiate specific parameters to gain the most social welfare. in step (7). Finally, Alice sends an acknowledgement to
Mobile agents might negotiate for terms of contracts, vendor Vw on issuing the ticket. Note that the security
allocation of complex tasks, and cooperation between requirements of information gathered by search agents are
different mobile agents in the marketplace, services/resource, different from the security requirements of information
and parameters of received proposals. Negotiation between exchanged by negotiating agents. The search agent traverses
agents allows cooperative and competitive sharing of the Internet searching for particular information and returns to
information. The negotiation can be single attribute the initiator with some results. The security requirements are
negotiations such as the purely price-based negotiation or to maintain integrity, privacy, authenticity, and non-
multi-attribute negotiation that considers multiple parameters repudiation of collected offers. Whereas, negotiating agent has
such as price, quality of service, shipping fees, payment to analyze and evaluate submitted offers autonomously,
method, warranty, etc. negotiate certain parameters with vendors and other agents,
An initiator host starts a negotiating session with an offer and consummate the deal on the consumer's behalf without the
request with the initiator's preferences, constraints and a need to return to the initiator. The negotiation might go
closing time for bid. This achieved by instantiating the three through many rounds of negotiation and it is fundamental to
mobile agents (CA, WA and IRA). These mobile agents are ensure the security of negotiated parameters with the different
engaged in search for offers by visiting the vendor hosts. We short listed vendors and submitted offers.
assume that agents migrate through public channels and B. Securing Mobile Agent Data
information exchanged during negotiating sessions isginforepresented chasgcomm unic messtiages.gThesrivyons In this section, we propose a security protocol that aims to
negotiation as and decisionmakin.ghfunvct are protect the information exchanged between the negotiatingpreservediby spltatei the dcriticd makin on-ctical dat mobile agents. Negotiation process starts with initiator host bypreervd b slitingthecrticl dtaandthenoncrticl dta firing the three agents. As shown in Fig. 1, the proposedinto two agents, the controller and the worker respectively [6]. fring the three agents(.eAsown in Fig. 1,the Ropsd
Vendors sumi thi offers to meet theinitiator's protocol has three rounds (i.e., Round 1, Round 2, and Roundprfeencers andmitconsthira ar ston mexp time oitheiaor' 3). In the following subsections, each of these rounds is
briefly discussed. For detailed information, interested readersrespective offers. The offer a vendor submits includes three y
parameters: (a) variables refer to choices to be made (e.g. could referto [9].
prices to be requested); (b) constraints refer to relationships
between variables which show if a combination of choices is
valid or not; and (c) domain refers to set of options for each In this round, the three agents (i.e., CA, WA and IRA) will
choice. The results of the three agents must be integrated and visit the potential vendors to negotiate particular parameters,
evaluating offers running decision functions to decide tothen verified before being accepted as correct so that an g g
accurate decision can be made on the winning vendor from select a set of short listed candidates. When each vendor host
which to buy the service/resource, receives the three agents, it performs the following processes.
* 1 r 11 ~~~~~First it executes the WA where it learns the customer'sLet's assume Mrs Alice plans to travel from Melbourne to F
Sydney and seeks the cheapest offer within six hours of the preferences and predefined constraints from the tuple S and
Request For Offer (RFO) for certain departure and return then provides its offer signed by its private key and encrypted
dates. She deploys a negotiating agent in step (1) and provides with the public key of the trusted host. The offer is appended
it with the request parameters including the deadline of RIO to the offer vector X at the CA. Next, it provides the itinerary
The negotiation agent then dispatches the three agents: CA registry agent with a partial itinerary details signed by its
WA, an IA to serc th maktlc fr ofrs fro private key and encrypted with the public key of the trusted
various vendors. Each vendor provides the negotiating agent host. The partial itinerary is appended to the itinerary registry
with its encrypted offer. Then, the agent in step (2) migrates to vector Z at the IRA. The itinerary registry agent would then
a trusted host where it decrypts, verifies, evaluates, and sorts scramble the elements of the vector. Finally, the last host in
offers securely. The agent might go for a second round of the agent's itinerary dispatches the three agents to the trusted
negotiation with two or more of the competing vendors with host where the information collected by the three agents
the intension of gaining the most social welfare for Alice. It would be integrated for verification, evaluation, and sorting
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purposes. itinerary registry vector Z at the itinerary registry agent. The
At a trusted host, the CA decrypts the tuple W it stores with agent would then scramble the elements of the vector. Finally,
its private decryption key. Then, it deduces the identity of the the host dispatches the three agents to the trusted host where
initiator host of the agent and computes a hash of the deduced the data collected by the three agents would be integrated for
identity. Next, it verifies if the received offers (i) are verification, sorting, and decision making purposes.
submitted to the initiator of its agent, (ii) meet the initiator's When the three agents arrive at the trusted host, the
preferences defined in the Request for Offer (RFO) it stores; controller agent performs the same task as in the first round
(iii) belong to the protocol run identified by the random nonce for the new offer vector. In addition, it verifies if the offers
r. (iv) verifies if the expiry time of each offer tn is longer than meet the negotiated parameters of interest of the agent and if
the expiry time of the bid it stores t. the expiry time of each offer is longer than the expiry time of
If any of the verification fails, it excludes the offer. the bid it stores. The steps at the trusted host of the first round
Otherwise, the CA decrypts the itinerary registry vector Z of protocol are repeated to assemble the agent's new itinerary
stored with the itinerary registry agent with its private according to their execution time at negotiated hosts.
decryption key. Next, it verifies if the vector relates to its The CA will then run the decision functions to decide on
agent by verifying if the hash stored with the elements of the the winning vendor from which service/resources will be
vector matches the computed hash and the nonce stored with bought. Once the preferred host is selected, the CA generates
the elements of the vector matches the nonce it stores. If the a purchase order that includes the bank account details of the
verifications are fulfilled, the CA assembles the agent's initiator host (i.e., consumer). It then signs the order with its
itinerary according to their execution time at visited hosts private key and encrypts it with the public key of the winning
(vendors). Next, it verifies if the assembled itinerary matches vendor. Finally, the trusted host dispatches the WA with the
the itinerary it would deduce from the offer vector. If the two purchase order as a commitment to the offer of the winning
itineraries do not match it indicates that the collected offers vendor and seeks acceptance from the winning vendor's host.
have been tampered with. Hence, it discards the agent's search
results. If the two itineraries match, it indicates that strong 3) Third Round
integrity is accomplished. The final round in the negotiation process involves issuing
The CA evaluates the offers using scoring functions and a payment order to the winning vendor upon her/his
ranks the offers to produce a set of short listed vendors. It also acceptance of the purchase order. When the winning vendor
runs decision functions to generate a new RFO for each short host receives the WA from the trusted host, it would respond
listed vendor encrypted with public key of the respective to the trusted host by sending an acceptance or rejection
vendor and stores them in vector U. The new offer includes message. If the accepts the purchase order, the CA (at the
particular parameters the agent intends to negotiate with each trusted host), sends a message of payment order to the
vendor. The CA generates a vector H that stores the particular consumer's Bank host. The message is signed by the private
parameters the agent intends to negotiate with each short listed key of the trusted host and encrypted with the public key of
vendor, a nonce, hashing of the identity of the initiator, and the bank service. Finally, at the winning vendor's host, the
new closing time of bid encrypted with its public encryption vendor receives the payment and then provides
key. It stores the vector for later verifications. Finally, the service/resource to the initiator host.
trusted service dispatches the three agents to the first host
(vendor) in the short listed vendors to negotiate. IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we reason the correctness of the proposed
2) Second Round protocol in the presence of the various fraudulent acts by an
In this round, the three agents will visit the short listed hosts adversary (i.e., intruders and malicious hosts) as discussed in
(i.e., vendors) to negotiate particular parameters with each of section 2. However, due to restrictions on the number of
the short listed vendors, evaluating new offers, running pages, we will only give a brief discussing. For details,
decision functions to decide on the winning vendor, and interested readers could refer to [9].
generating purchase order.
When each of the short listed host receives the CA, WA A. Security analysis
and IRA, the host performs the following steps: First, it The security of negotiation is of concern to both vendors
executes the worker agent, decrypts the new Request for Offer and consumers. We now show that the proposed protocol can
and learns the parameters the agent wishes to negotiate Then, achieve the aimed for security properties as follows.
it provides its new offer signed by its private key and
encrypted with the public key of the trusted host. The offer is Claim 1: The proposed protocol ensures strong integrity.
appended the offer vector X at the controller agent. Next, it
updates the itinerary registry agent with a partial itinerary Proof: One way an adversary could violate the integrity of
details signed by its private key and encrypted with the public the data exchanged is by tampering with parameters of
key of the trusted host. The partial itinerary is appended to the Request for Offer (FRO), bid closing time, identity of
initiator, random nonce identifying a protocol run, collected
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offers, parameters to negotiate with short listed vendors, Proof: Without proper countermeasures, an intruder might
payment and purchase orders at the controller and worker intercept an offer signed by a vendor, strips off the signature
agents respectively. As the parameters: Request for Offer and then signs it with its private key. Hence, the offer would
(FRO), bid closing time, identity of initiator, random nonce be erroneously authenticated by the trusted host. The proposed
identifying a protocol run are stored with the controller agent protocol prevents this from occurring as the vendor signs the
for later verifications, any tampering with parameters could be offer it submits and then encrypts it with the public key of the
easily detected. Also, collected offers, parameters to negotiate trusted host. Hence, an intruder would not be able to sign
with each vendor, payment and purchase orders are stored other vendor's offers by its private key. The trusted host would
encrypted at the worker agent, and thus tempering with these receive offer signed by the genuine vendors.
parameters is prevented.
An adversary might truncate or delete an offer of a
competngavendrsasy welltastreplaes its s tted offer wh Claim 6: In the proposed protocol, the verifications arecompeting vendor as well as replaces itS submitted offer with
acuteaccurate.
a new competing offer. These threats can be easily detected as
the itinerary registry vector stored at the itinerary agent has
identities of any visited host. If an adversary replaces its offer Po the verificationsaecurtea offrwould only
with a new competing offer, the itinerary registry vector ea e i enverifications show the following:
would show that the host is visited twice during a negotiation * The offer Is generated for the genune intiator of its
round and it is inadmissible. agent.
* The offer meets the initiator's preferences defined in the
Claim 2: The proposed protocol ensures non-repudiation. RFO it stores and the values of parameters negotiated
during the second round of protocol.
Proof: The threat to the non-repudiation includes * The offer belongs to the protocol run identified by the
appending a fake offer and then repudiates it or sending a random nonce r.
purchase or payment order and then repudiates it. The * The expiry time of each offer tj is longer than the expiry
proposed protocol prevents these threats from being time of the bid it stores t'.
materialized as vendor has to sign its offer with its private key B. Efficiency analysis
and the trusted host has to sign payment/ purchase orders with The proposed protocol does not require complex and
its private key. intensive computations. The communication and processing
costs and time incurred are nominal. It only applies
Claim 3: The proposed protocol ensures anonymity of the moderatinensivecmatins ( tion and
client andvendors. ~~~moderately intensive computations (encryption andclient and vendors. decryption) to the exchanged messages so as to accomplish
the required security properties. Also, the offer a vendor
Proof: At the worker and controller agents, the anonymity sbisol ossso udmna aa fe eal
could be breached by the disclosure of the identity of the iuding the expirti of thedofer, hash ofte detito
initiator and identities of negotiated vendors. The proposed theincluintit and noneid tentifyin theprotocol run. Also,tthe
protocol ensure anonymity as only a hash of the initiator's gen titianer only consistsooffundamenta dta
identity is stored with the worker agent and the parameters identityaoithvenr,a of thesidtiof thentiator
stored with the controller agent are signed by the initiator and extion tie of,thagn at thevendor' ost, andtanonc
then encrypted with the public key of the trusted host. Also, entifn the otol run.
each offer is signed by the vendor's private key and is then Thenproposedprotocol fio.
encryptd withublic ky of th truste host.The proposed protocol facilitates the verification process byencrypted wihpulceohetcarrying out the verifications at a trusted host rather than at
the initiator's host. The initial verification parameters: nonceClaim 4: The proposed protocol ensures confidentiality of ietfigpooo u,coigtm fbd n F r
thexhne aa dentifying protocol run, closing time of bid, and R-FO aresigned by the initiator and encrypted by the public key of the
trusted host. These parameters can only be decrypted by the
Proof: The adversary could breach the confidentiality trusted host, which would perform multiple verifications on
spying oif aoa thcethe collected offers before it sorts the offers. The verifications
issues of agreements, parameters to negotiate with short listed are accurate as an offer would only be accepted if the
vendors as well as the initiator's bank details The proposed
protocol prevents confidentiality breaches of the exchanged .hfesgnrae o h eun intao oit
data as each offer, parameters to negotiate with each vendor agent.
and intiatorsbankdetais are ll encypted * The offer meets the initiator's preferences defined in the
RFO it stores and the values of parameters negotiated
Claim 5: The proposed protocol hinders the security threats to during the second round of protocol.
authentication. * The offer belongs to the protocol run identified by the
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random nonce r. Networking and Computing in Healthcare Industry,
* The expiry time of each offer tj is longer than the expiry HEALTHCOM 2004, Pages 19-24, June 2004, Odawara,
time of the bid it stores t'. Japan.
It does not require complex coordination between the [5] S. D. Ramchurn, "Multi-agent Negotiation Using Trust
controller, worker, and itinerary registry agents. It only and Persuasion", Ph.D. dissertation, ECS, University of
requires the integration of the results of the three agents at the Southampton, 2004.
trusted host that handles all processes that includes: [6] H. Vogler, A. Spriestersbach, and M. Moschgath,
verification, sorting, negotiation, decision making, purchase "Protecting Competitive Negotiation of Mobile Agents",
o r g e a pl, it In IEEE Workshop on Future Trends of Distributedorders, agreement, and payment orders. Last bUt not least, it Computing Systems FTDCS'99, 1999.
would not result in money fritter, commonly induced by [7 mpJnings,eP. FTin, A. R m o P n
malicious acts: breaching the privacy of collected offers, SieR. and M. Wooldidg. "Auomated Negotiation:
customer's bank account details, identities of negotiated Prospects, Methods, and Challenges", In the International
vendors, or negotiated parameters and tampering with Request Journal of Group Decision and Negotiation, 10(2): 199-
for Offer and collected offer. 215, 2001.
[8] P. Bellavista, A. Corradi, C. Federici, R. Montanari, D.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTION Tibaldi, "Security for Mobile Agents: Issues and
In this paper, we discussed mobile agent based e-commerce Challenges. Invited Chapter in Handbook of Mobile
framework and various security threats that mobile agent- Computing", I. Mahgoub. M. Ilyas (eds.), ISBN 0-84931 -
based e-commerce systems face with emphases on the data 971-4, CRC Press, Dec. 2004.
exchanged between the mobile agents in the course of e- [9] R. Jaljouli and J. Abawajy, "Electronic Negotiation and
negotiation. To address the security problems associated with Security of Exchanged Information in e-Commerce", TR
the e-negotiation process, we proposed a security protocol that C07/12, Deakin University, School of Engineering and
Information Technology, 14fi September, 2007.maintains the security properties of the information exchanged Inomto Tehooy'4 Setmbr 207[10] R. Jaljouli, "Formal Methods in the Enhancement of theduring e-negotiation: privacy, authentication, non-repudiation, Data Security Protocols of Mobile Agents", In
anonymity, and strong integrity. We showed that the proposed Proceedings of the 4th ACS/IEEE International
protocol has sufficient security mechanisms that would Conference on Computer Systems and Applications,
prevent or at least detect the various security attacks and March 2006.
preserves the security properties essential for mobile agent [11]H. Vogler, A. Spriestersbach, and M. Moschgath,
based e-commerce systems. Moreover, the protocol is efficient "Protecting Competitive Negotiation of Mobile Agents",
as compared to the existing protocols. It does not require In IEEE Workshop on Future Trends of Distributed
complex and intensive computations. The future works is to Computing Systems FTDCS'99, 1999.
verify the protocol formally using formal verification methods
such as Symbolic Trace Analyzer (STA), SPIN model checker
or Mur(p and prove that the proposed protocol is free of
security attacks. We also made a number of assumptions such
as the agent's code remains intact throughout the agent's
itinerary. We will extend the proposed protocol when these
assumptions are relaxed.
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